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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS
FOR FRAUD UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 create express civil remedies for certain violations of the se-
curities laws.3 More important in recent years, however, has been the
implied right to private actions under the general anti-fraud provisions
-rule lOb-5,4 promulgated under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,5 and
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act." In shaping the elements of damages
available in implied anti-fraud private actions, courts are divided as
to whether punitive damages should be allowed.1
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
2 Id. §§ 78a-hh.
3 1933 Act: § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) (false registration statement); § 12, 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1964) (false prospectus or communication with respect to a sale). 1934 Act:
§ 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) (manipulation of security prices); § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1964) (short-swing profits of insiders); § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964) (false or mis-
leading document filed with the SEC). The express actions are common law actions
modified by simplifying the elements of proof. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LA-FRAUD-
SEC RULE lOb-5, § 2.7(1) (1969) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]; 3 L. Loss, SEcuaIrTs
REGULATION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See also Shulman, Civil
Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). The Supreme Court refused to reject an implied
private action under rule lOb-5 when the opportunity presented itself. Surowitz v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467
n.9 (1969). In addition, a private action under rule lOb-5 has been recognized by ten
of eleven courts of appeals and a district court in the remaining circuit, and no court
that has considered the issue has denied such an action in theory. 6 Loss 3871-73.
Approximately one-third of the cases, public and private, brought pursuant to all
federal securities statutes are under rule lOb-5. BROMBERG § 2.5(6).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
6 Id. § 77q. Notwithstanding serious doubts as to the availability of an implied pri-
vate action pursuant to this section (3 Loss 1785-87), most courts that have considered
the question accept a private action on the same reasoning used to imply a private action
under rule lOb-5. 6 Loss 3913-15.
A third general antifraud provision, Securities Exchange Act § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(c)(1) (1964), is limited to brokers and dealers in over-the-counter transactions.
7 Opposing punitive damages: Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied,
38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969)
(dictum), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 681 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364 (D.N.J. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955). See also Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,494,
at 98,318 (D. Utah Oct. 17, 1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis.
1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
Allowing punitive damages: deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D.
Colo. 1969); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dic-
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I
THEORIES OF IMPLIED PRIVATE ACTIONS
None of the theories that courts have relied upon in allowing
private actions for securities fraud are adequate for deciding whether
punitive damages should lie in such actions. One theory is that the
right to recover damages for injuries sustained through the violation
of a statute "is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law
that where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it
should appear very clearly and plainly." s Deciding to allow an action
for damages, however, does not determine the measure of damages.
Punitive damages for aggravated conduct are often recoverable in a
tort action for deceit,9 but an inference of punitive damages from the
mere presence of a statutory prohibition of fraud in securities trans-
actions seems too strained to be conclusive. 10
A second theory for implying a private fraud action rests on
section 29(b) of the 1934 Act,' which voids contracts made in violation
of the Act. This section "almost necessarily" implies a private remedy,
for "[t]he statute would be of little value unless a party to the contract
could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of obligations under it
or to escape its consequences."'12 This theory sounds in contract, and
it seems illogical to apply it to a situation that is basically tortious.
Even if the contract theory is accepted, however, it is of no aid in
determining the availability of punitive damages. The general theory
is that punitive damages will not be allowed in simple contract actions,
but some courts have permitted punitive damages where a tortious
breach is combined with a contract claim.13
Another approach was indicated by the Supreme Court when it
turn); Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445, 449 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (dictum). See also
Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968).
8 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); accord,
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934), modified by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286
(1965).
9 W. PiROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
10 See Note, Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5, 69 COLUm. L. Rv. 1057, 1062-63 (1969).
31 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964).
12 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13 G. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 202 (rev. ed. 1965); L.
Ss mPSoN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 195, at 394 (1965); Simpson, Punitive Damages for
Breach of Contract, 20 OHIo ST. L.J. 284 (1959); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law
of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, 531-33 (1957); see PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417 F.2d 659; 663 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1970).
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approved the implication of a private remedy under section 14(a) of
the 1984 Act 14 in J. L Case Co. v. Borak.15 The Court held that federal
courts have power to effect the broad remedial purpose of Congress in
establishing a comprehensive scheme of securities regulations; the
existence of this power implies the ability to grant any remedy nor-
mally available to a litigant in similar cases of economic wrongdoing.' 6
But the broad congressional intent to regulate securities transactions
is of no assistance in determining the elements of damages in an action
that Congress failed to consider.'
1
II
POLICIES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Availability of Punitive Damages Under the Statutory Schemes
1. The 1933 Act
There is no wording in the 1933 Act that expressly limits section
17(a) to compensatory damages. 8 On the other hand, the sections of
the 1933 Act that explicitly grant private remedies also explicitly limit
damages.' 9 The absence of such a specific limitation in section 17(a)
arguably evidences a congressional intent to allow punitive damages,
but this argument fails because the private remedy under section 17(a)
is implied by the courts; congressional intent as to the elements of
damages is nonexistent.20
14 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
15 377 US. 426 (1964). Although § 14(a) relates to proxy violations and not neces-
sarily to fraudulent activities, the general theories supporting implication of a private
action seem uniform throughout the securities acts. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
90 S. Ct. 616, 625 (1970).
18 377 US. at 433.
17 See, e.g., Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legisla-
tive Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963); Comment, Civil Remedies Available to Buyers
and Sellers Under the 1933 and 1934 Federal Securities Laws, 38 WAsH. L. Rrv. 627, 636
(1963); Comment, Punitive Damages Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act: A Myopic
View of Congressional Intent, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 792, 797-98 (1969); Note, Civil Liability
Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. Rxv. 537, 542 (1956).
18 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1970).
19 §§ 11(e), (g), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), (g) (1964); § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
20 Cf. Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Teamsters Local 753,
249 F. Supp. 664, 670 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (implied private action under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964)):
A "Competent Congress" argument is available to each side. On the one
hand, § 303 explicitly limits a plaintiff's recovery to damages "by him sus-
tained." The argument is that, in writing § 303, Congress demonstrated that it
[Vol. 55:646
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An argument better than one based on congressional "intent" rests
on the distinction between the nature of the private remedies provided
by section 17(a) and by sections 1121 and 1222 of the 1933 Act. Sections
11 and 12 are not essentially fraud23 or tort 24 actions, and each so
limits recovery as to exclude punitive damages. 25 The implied action
under section 17(a), on the other hand, is of a different type; it is a
fraud action and requires proof different from that required under
sections 11 and 12.26 In instances of securities violations not prohibited
knew how to limit damages when it wanted to, and that Congress's failure to do so
in § 301 indicates that no such limitation was intended in § 201.
On the other hand, Congress has written explicit provisions providing for
exemplary or punitive damages into numerous other statutes. E.g., the anti-trust
laws. .. [and] the patent laws. ... In writing these provisions, Congress has dem-
onstrated that it knows how to provide for such damages when it wants to. The
argument is that Congress' [sic] failure to so provide in § 301 indicates that such
damages are not to be awarded under § 201 ...
At best, this kind of point is unpersuasive makeweight. Where, as here, there
are strong reasons for reading the statute one way, rather than another, I do not
find it necessary to divine the intent of Congress by choosing between two
credible, but conflicting, versions of the same bad argument.
See also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
21 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
22 Id. § 77L
23 E.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951) (§ 11); 3
Loss 1693 (liability under § 12(1) is "virtually absolute'); id. at 1700 (§ 12(2) is basically
a contract action for rescission rather than a tort action for deceit).
24 The difference between §§ 11 and 12 and § 17(a) private actions may be analogized
to the distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum in criminal law. Malum
in se (§ 17) would be a crime regardless of any statutory violation due to the inherent
evil of the act, but malum prohibitum (§§ 11 and 12) is wrongful only due to the en-
actment of a regulatory statute. See generally R. PEMuNS, CRuMiNAL LAw 784-98 (2d ed.
1969).
At least one commentator believes there is a distinction between §§ 11 and 12(2)
and § 17(a) as to the nature of the remedy. 82 HARv. L. Rv. 951, 953-54 (1969).
25 Section 11(g) provides: "In no case shall the amount recoverable under this
section exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public." 48 Stat. 83 (1933),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964). A plaintiff under § 12 may "recover the consideration paid for
such security ... less the amount of any income received thereon . . . or . . . damages
if he no longer owns the security." 48 Stat. 84 (193), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
Although some courts have alluded to the possibility of punitive damages under § 12
in cases in which plaintiff no longer holds the security for which he paid (see Berley v.
Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nagel v. Prescott & Co., 36 F.R.D. 445,
449 (N.D. Ohio 1964)), it seems clear from the nature of § 12(2) that damages should be
limited to the equivalent of rescission. 3 Loss 1721.
26 Although many courts have instinctively implied a private action in § 17(a) in
any sale situation covered by rule lOb-5 (6 Loss 3913-14), a better rule would be to allow
such an action under § 17(a) only where fraud is alleged. The reasoning behind allowing
mere negligent misrepresentation to form the basis of a rule lob-5 action does not apply
to the 1933 Act, which covers such conduct amply in § 11 and § 12. 3 Loss 1785; see
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 976 (1969); Weiss, Globus v. Law Research: A Case Study, 6
ABA LAw NoTEs 1, 2 (1969).
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by sections 11 or 12 but within the prohibition of section 17(a), the
need for an effective fraud remedy for aggravated conduct under section
17(a) may justify a recovery of punitive damages. And even though
some instances of securities violations may fall within the bans of
section 17(a) and either section 11 or section 12, the sections provide
separate causes of action whose measures of damages are separately
calculated. The recovery limitations in sections 11 and 12 have no
bearing on a recovery based on a section 17(a) theory.
2. The 1934 Act
Unlike the 1933 Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 con-
tains an express measure of damages. Section 28(a) limits recovery
"under the provisions of this chapter" to "actual damages. ' 27 Several
courts and commentators argue that this section limits recovery in an
implied action under rule 1Ob-5, 28 while others make the conclusory
statement that "under the provisions of this chapter" refers only to
actions expressly created by the Act and not to implied remedies.
2 9
The latter view seems correct, lack of analysis notwithstanding.
Sections 930 and 18(a)31 are intended to provide anti-fraud actions,
but stringent causation tests32 in both sections and the need for willful
intent in section 9 have rendered these sections impotent.33 Recogniz-
27 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
28 E.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied,
90 S. Ct. 681 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 977 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968); Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345, 364 (D.N.J. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Meisel v. North Jersey Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 769-70 (D.N.J. 1955); BROMBERG § 9.1, at 229;
Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 624 (1966); Note,
Remedies For Private Parties Under Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv. 337,
338 (1969); see Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,494, at
98,318 (D. Utah Oct. 17, 1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1962),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co., 1964-66 CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,134, 95,139 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (conclusion of law without reference to
§ 28(a)); 6 Loss 3781-83.
29 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Colo. 1969); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 444-45 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (dictum); Baumel v.
Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968) (dictum), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 412
F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969) (punitive damages not allowed), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 681 (1970);
cf. Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 848 (E.D. Va. 1968).
30 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1964) (prohibition against manipulation of security prices).
31 Id. § 78r(a) (liability for misleading statements).
32 3 Loss 1748-49, 1752.
33 In no case adjudicated under § 9 has plaintiff obtained a final judgment. 3 Loss
1748; see, e.g., Brittin v. Schweickart, 1957-61 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,433, 93,436 (S.D.N.Y.
1961). Few actions have been brought under § 18(a), but, again, none of the plaintiffs has
had success. 3 Loss 1753 n.228.
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ing the need for an effective private anti-fraud provision, the courts
have implied one under rule 1Ob-5, although neither Congress34 nor
the SEC 5 intended a private action under section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. 36
Because of the policies the implied action seeks to further, and because
the express anti-fraud actions are ineffective, private actions under
rule 1Ob-5 should be allowed full effectiveness, including the avail-
ability, if needed, of punitive damages. It would be as self-defeating
automatically to apply the limitation of section 28(a) to the implied
action as it would be to a'pply the causation tests of sections 9 and
18(a).37
B. Policies Supporting Punitive Damages Under Section 17(a) and
Rule 10b-5
Punishment is usually not a function of the civil law,38 but
"[w]here the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and delib-
erate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime,
all but a few courts have permitted the jury to award in the tort
action 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages . ... "39 Punitive damages
serve the purposes of both individual and general deterrence and of
retribution." Because they are more than compensatory, these damages
encourage individuals to bring private actions where public officials
34 See Ruder, supra note 17.
35 The drafters of the rule had no idea that it would be used as the basis for private
litigation. Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. IAw. 793,
922 (1967).
36 The functions of both § 9 (see United States v. Lilley, 291 F. Supp. 989, 993 (S.D.
Tex. 1968)) and § 18 (e.g., Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 189-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 36-37 (E.D. Pa. 1964)) have been
absorbed by rule lOb-5.
37 Section 16(b) is unproductive in this analysis. This section is similar to § 11 and
§ 12 of the 1933 Act in that it explicitly allows a private non-fraud action. See, e.g.,
Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 965-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Damages-recoverable only from certain insiders and only by the issuer (or derivatively
by its stockholders)-are limited to "short-swing" profits. Section 28(a) is irrelevant,'
except to prohibit double recovery, due to this self-contained limitation.
In some cases in which insiders are liable under § 16(b), they may also be liable
under rule lOb-5 to individual plaintiffs. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
38 E.g., PROSSER § 2, at 9; Friedman, Delay as a Bar to Rescission, 26 CORNELL L.Q.
426, 447 (1941): "It may be said that one guilty of fraud is entitled to no undue con-
sideration from the court. Yet the policy of the law on its civil side is not punishment."
(footnote omitted).
39 PROSSER § 2, at 9 (footnote omitted); see Note, supra note 13.
40 PROSSER § 2, at 9; Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Re-
appraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 1158, 1161-63 (1966); Note, Criminal
Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. Cat. L. Rv. 408 n.1 (1967); see
Note, supra note 13, at 521-22.
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cannot effectively regulate the field,41 or where the penalties of the law
are not enforced or enforceable.4
Punitive damages have been implied into other federal statutes,
such as a civil rights statute,4 an admiralty statute,44 and the Civil
Aeronautics Act,4 5 in situations in which a need for such recovery was
demonstrated. In labor law the weight of authority is against allowing
punitive damages, 46 and this fact has been cited as evidence of a divi-
41 See PROSSER § 2, at 11. Private enforcement of the securities laws is necessary due
to the limited resources of the SEC. E.g., Bernfeld, Class Actions and Federal Securities
Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 78 (1969); Loomis, The S.E.C. Looks at BarChris, 24 Bus. LAW.
693, 694 (1969).
42 See generally Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal
of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158 (1966). This criterion seems applicable to
the securities laws. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
43 Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1967), and Basista v. Weir, 340
F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965), read punitive damages into the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
44 In re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967), revrd
sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), petition
for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3452 (U.S. May 16, 1969) (No. 1403, 1968 term; renumbered No.
124, 1969 term), held the master of a ship and his corporate employer liable for punitive
damages under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), when grievously poor seamanship was
shown. The court of appeals reversed as to the corporate employer, but stated that punitive
damages would be available in a proper case. The absence of a provision for punitive dam-
ages in either the Jones Act or the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1964), to which the Jones Act refers, did not disturb the court:
Exemplary damages are the product of the common law and are not a creature
of legislation. Thus, while certain statutes may specifically authorize the recovery
of punitive damages, such specific reference is neither common nor necessary.
276 F. Supp. at 176.
The Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have denied liability without proof
of fault under the Jones Act, but in a recent case a court allowed plaintiff to amend his
complaint to allege punitive damages. The court reasoned that if plaintiff could prove
aggravated fault, recovery for punitive damages was not inconsistent with these prior
holdings or congressional intent. Gunnip v. Warner Co., 43 F.R.D. 365 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
45 The availability of punitive damages has been implied into § 404(b) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1964). In Wills v. TWA, 200 F. Supp. 360
(S.D. Cal. 1961), plaintiff was delayed due to the overbooking of a flight on which he had
a confirmed reservation. In allowing punitive damages, the court analogized to the Civil
Rights Act and attempted to vindicate the rights of all passengers and protect against
future abuses. Id. at 367. The function of punitive damages under this Act could be
compared with the function of punitive damages under the securities laws:
[T]he purpose of the award is two-fold, to complement the criminal and injunc-
tive provisions of the Act, and to afford the courts the means to make effective
vindication of the rights of the individual airline passenger which have been
willfully or wantonly violated.
Id. at 368.
46 E.g., Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (§ 303(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964)); Magelssen v. Local 518,
Plasterers and Cement Masons, 240 F. Supp. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (§ 101(a)(5) of the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964)); Burris v. International Bhd. of
[Vol. 55:646
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sion on the question whether punitive damages should be implied into
federal statutes.47 There is, however, a "peculiar interdependency of
labor and management in the modern industrial complex. '48 The pur-
pose of the labor laws is to promote industrial peace, and punishing an
offender with punitive damages seems counterproductive. 49 The parties
to a securities fraud action are not similarly interdependent, and the se-
curities laws serve functions different from those served by the labor
laws. Their policies may, on balance, favor punitive damages. 50
Teamsters, 224 F. Supp. 277 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (§ 101(a)(5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964)); Comment, Monetary Recovery Under the Federal Labor
Statutes, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 881, 902-03 (1967). Contra, e.g., Local 127, United Shoe Workers
of America v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962) (§ 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964)); Farowitz v. Musicians
Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (§ 101(a)(2) of the Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1964)).
The implied private action under § 301(a) of the LMRA offers some analogy to
implied private actions under the securities laws. The Supreme Court in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.. 448 (1957), envisaged broad judicial action in forming
remedies. This was to be done with an eye toward the purposes of the statute, and "[t]he
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." Id. at
457. Compare J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
47 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1284 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970).
48 Note, Labor Law: Runaway Shop: Compensatory and Punitive Damages under
L.M.R.A. Sections 301 and 302, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 112, 117 (1961).
49 Brandwen, Punitive-Exemplary Damages in Labor Relations Litigation, 29 U. CHI.
L. Rrv. 460 (1962). "[T]he doctrine [of punitive damages] will only exacerbate labor-
management relations and threaten stability in our society. There may still be an ad-
equate residuum of admonition in compensatory damages to serve the legitimate aims of
tort liability." Id. at 482. But it is unclear whether the "remedial" nature of the labor
laws necessarily excludes punitive damages if such damages have an individual rather
than a general deterrence effect: "imposition of sanctions which exceed what is necessary
to pacify the particular labor-management irritation before the court are not permitted."
Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Teamsters Local 753, 249 F. Supp.
664, 670 (N.D. IIl. 1966) (emphasis added). Punitive damages, therefore, might be assessed
in extraordinary labor relations cases. Id. at 671.
80 Congress's purpose in passing § 17(a) was undoubtedly to establish a general anti-
fraud provision more effective than a common law fraud action in securities transactions.
See 3 Loss 1423-24. Rule lOb-5 was enacted merely to extend the effect of § 17(a) to aid
sellers of securities as well as buyers. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230
(May 21, 1942):
The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied
only to brokers and dealers. The new rule doses a loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or
companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.
See also Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 35, at 922.
The rule was enacted after a proposal to achieve the same result by legislative action was
unsuccessfully made in Congress. 3 Loss 1426-27.
Attempts to differentiate the policies supporting punitive damages under these two
provisions seem unfounded. See, egg., Comment, Fashioning a Lid for Pandora's Box: A
Legitimate Role for Rule 10b-5 in Private Actions Against Insider Trading on a National
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Arguments can be made that express provisions of the securities
acts adequately achieve the goals of retribution and deterrence.51 Both
fines and imprisonment are provided for by the acts. 52 Criminal pros-
ecutions under rule lOb-5, however, "have not been particularly ex-
tensive or significant,"5 3 and, in situations where fraudulent activities
could be highly profitable, the deterrent effect of fines seems minimal.54
Further, the "psychological deterrent" connected to a conviction for a
"white collar crime" is a relatively unknown factor.55
A second potential deterrent against securities fraud is the threat
of suspension of registrations, suspension of trading, or expulsion from
a national securities exchange for violations of the 1934 Act.55 But the
Stock Exchange, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 404, 420 (1969); Note, Securities Regulation-Punitive
Damages Appropriate in Civil Action Based on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
54 VA. L. REV. 1560, 1568 (1968).
51 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); see Note, supra note 50, at 1570-71.
52 The 1933 Act provides for a maximum fine of $5,000 and/or five years in prison
for willful violations of the provisions of the Act or willful misstatements or omissions of
material facts in a registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964). Any person who will-
fully and knowingly violates the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act is subject to a
maximum fine of $10,000 and/or two years in prison, but no person may be imprisoned
"if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation." Id. § 78fE(a).
For a discussion of the interrelationship of punitive damages and criminal safeguards,
see Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
408 (1967).
53 BROMBERG § 10.3. For a list of the reported cases see 3 Loss 1449 n.15. Although
such actions have "some deterrent effect," exact statistics are unavailable. BROMBERC § 10.3.
54 Comment, supra note 50, at 411.
55 Much "white collar crime" probably goes undetected, and studies and statistics
on such crimes are sketchy. It seems, however, that there is much more public sympathy
for corporate violators than for common criminals. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT: TnE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 48 (1967).
Another factor in the weakness of deterrence is the failure to prosecute. In an
analogous situation, a district court reviewed defendant's correspondence regarding his
plan to violate the antitrust laws. His letters outlined the benefits to be received by the
conspiracy and weighed them against the chances of being prosecuted:
He passes lightly over the likelihood of a criminal prosecution-the only lan-
guage, perhaps, that he could understand. His judgment in this regard has
proved to be correct. This court has not been apprised of the reason for failure of
criminal prosecution. This unanswered question rests on the doorstep of the
Department of Justice.
United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 606 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
The difficult evidentiary problems in a criminal securities fraud case (see SEC,
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARuETS, pt. 1, at 807-08 (1963)) seem to enhance
the deterrent effect of punitive damages in a civil case, in which the burden of proof is
lighter.
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5)-(7), 78s(a) (1964). There are no comparable provisions in the
1933 Act.
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effect of these remedies is not as far-ranging as it may seem, 57 and such
rapidly developing fields as insider liability58 under rule lOb-5 are
entirely excluded.59
The sheer size of purely compensatory recoveries may also have a
significant deterrent effect. This contention, however, ignores one of
the goals of punitive damages in such cases. If recovery is limited to
plaintiff's "actual damages," even if profits made by defendant at plain-
tiff's expense are included,60 it still may be profitable for defendant
to violate the law, since there is little chance of being discovered in
every fraudulent act.6' Although the likelihood of apprehension re-
mains constant, allowance of punitive damages would ensure that no
possibility of profit is'left open to a wrongdoer caught in a blatantly
fraudulent scheme.
Perhaps the most forceful argument against the need for punitive
damages rests on the liberalization of the class action under the revised
federal rule of civil procedure 23.62 Prior to the 1966 revision, effective
57 The section that applies to stocks traded on a national exchange personally affects
only members or officers of the exchange (id. § 78s(a)(3)); the provision that covers over-
the-counter securities only allows punishment of broker-dealers and their associates (id.
§ 78o(b)(5)).
58 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
59 The inadequacy of these remedies is "the .primary reason" motivating the SEC to
encourage private actions under rule lOb-5. Comment, supra note 50, at 411.
60 Recovery of profits made by defendant is not always granted. See Estate Counsel-
ing Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.
1962) (applying the "out-of-pocket" measure of damages); Note, Measurement of Damages
in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WAsf. U.L.Q. 165, 175.
61 See Comment, supra note 50, at 417; cf. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46
F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942):
In analyzing the likelihood of civil prosecution at some time in the distant
future, . . . [the antitrust violator] coldly weighs the consequences on the one
side, together with the penalties that might be exacted, and the ultimate financial
gains on the other side. Then ... he decides to do it and risk the whipping.
Id. at 606.
62 See generally BROMBERO § 11.6; 6 Loss 8938-70; Bernfeld, supra note 41; Comment,
Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies
Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. R~v. 889 (1968); Note, Class Action Treat-
ment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEo. WASH. L. R~v. 1150
(1968). See also Note, Securities Regulation-Class Actions-Common Questions of Mis-
representation Predominate Over Individual Questions of Reliance-Punitive Damages
Are Not Recoverable Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 44 NoTRE DAME LAW.
984-90 (1969).
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules stated that
a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations
may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite
the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered
by individuals within the class.
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23(b)(3), 39 F.R.D. 98, 103 (1966).
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use of the class action was often impossible in securities fraud cases03
in which many small claims arose from the same fraudulent conduct.
Liberalization has made the class action a more attractive device in
securities fraud cases.64 Thus, in light of the new rule, the argument
that punitive damages are especially needed where private parties can-
not afford to prosecute their small claims65 seems to lose its impact.
This is not entirely true, however, since most of "[t]he principal ques-
tions that were litigated . . . under the old rule survive in varying
degrees,"66 and new procedural requirements partially limit the effec-
tiveness of the class action.67 Furthermore, a class action would be dis-
missed in a securities fraud case if there were materially different
statements or omissions or a significant variance in reliance.6 In any
event, a class action and punitive damages need not be mutually ex-
clusive. The proportion of punitive damages to be awarded each mem-
ber of the class may be determined in separate proceedings when the
division of the actual damages is made.6 9
Although the express statutory scheme does not adequately deter
or punish, the question remains whether awarding punitive damages
in securities fraud litigation raises unwarranted problems and injus-
tices. Fears have been expressed that because of the numerous persons
affected by a securities fraud juries will award huge recoveries;7 0 an
issuer or underwriter could possibly be bankrupted by one wrong.71
This ignores the court's control over the amount of a jury's award of
63 Under the prior rule a class action in a securities fraud case included only
members of the class who were parties to the action or intervenors before the court.
Bernfeld, supra note 41, at 78 n.5. See also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 297-98 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); 6 Loss 3940-41; Comment, supra note 62, at
890-93; Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule
23, 36 GEo. WASH. L. Riv. 1150, 1150-51 (1968).
64 The judgment in a class action under the new rule is now binding on all members
of the class unless they request exclusion. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
65 See PRossER § 2, at 11.
66 6 Loss 3944.
67 Comment, supra note 62, at 893. The notice provisions present especially "formi-
dable" problems. Bernfeld, supra note 41, at 86.
68 Berger v. Purolator Prods., Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
69 See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 62, at 103. Punitive damages may be an
incentive for members of the class to come forward and claim their share of the award.
70 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970).
71 Id.; cf. Note, Insiders' Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for the Illegal Purchase of
Actively Traded Securities, 78 YALE L.J. 864, 891 (1969). But see Comment, supra note 50,
at 417-20. Fears of complex problems as to punitive recoveries may be ill-founded, for
"[m]ost lOb-5 private actions have involved securities of small, closely held corporations
traded in face-to-face transactions." Id. at 406.
[Vol. 55:646
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
punitive damages. 72 Also, in determining punitive damages the jury
is allowed to consider defendant's wealth 7 and other personal criteria.74
Further problems with punitive damages in securities fraud cases
may arise if actions are brought in more than one court. The courts
may be unable to coordinate their activities in order to control the
size of damages awards, and the need for punitive damages may be
eliminated after the first few recoveries, so that later plaintiffs may
be deprived of the benefits of a punitive damages "windfall."' 75 These
difficulties, however, will not arise in the typical implied private anti-
fraud action, which involves the "securities of small, closely held
corporations traded in face-to-face transactions."78 And in the extra-
ordinary case involving a huge transaction, the actions, under proper
circumstances, may be transferred for consolidation;7 7 alternatively, a
72 Reduction of a punitive damages award by appellate courts is not uncommon in
New York. See cases cited in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 n.12
(2d Cir. 1967). Arguments have been made in favor of increasing the judge's power of re-
view over the size of the jury's award of punitive damages. Note, supra note 13, at 529-31.
73 PaossER § 2, at 14; Note, supra note 13, at 528.
74 Punitive damages allow "additional flexibility for admonition, so that the punish-
ment may be roughly adjusted to the offender." Note, supra note 13,at 524.
75 Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285-86 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); see 82 HARv. L. RV. 951, 957 (1969).
78 Comment, supra note 50, at 406; see Loomis, Enforcement Problems Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 14 Bus. LAw. 665, 672-73 (1959).
77 All actions under rule lOb-5 must be brought in federal district courts; actions
under § 17(a), however, may be brought in federal or state courts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v,
78aa (1964). Federal district courts are empowered, in their discretion, to transfer any
civil action to any other district in which it might have been brought, when this change
will serve the convenience of the parties and the goal of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1964). See generally Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154-55 (1967); F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.18 (1965); Judicial Economy: Fairness and Convenience of
Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 105-06 (1969).
A district court recently employed this device to consolidate a lob-5 action brought in
several districts. Wolf v. Ackerman, CCH FED. Sac. L. RE'. 92,525 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20,
1969). A total amount of punitive damages can be decided upon in a central district
(e.g., where the fraud took place, the principal place of business of the issuer, or the place
of the exchange where the purchase or sale occurred) and an escrow fund established from
which plaintiffs who prove their injuries may claim a share within a specified period of
time. See SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., BNA Sac. REG. & L. REP. A-14, No. 24, Nov. 12,
1969 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1969) (defendant ordered to pay insider's profits to trustee to
satisfy judgment); BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-7, No. 19, Oct. 8, 1969 (SEC proposes that
insiders' profits be returned to corporation of defrauded stockholders to be placed in
interest-bearing fund out of which judgments will be paid); Note, A Suggested Locus of
Recovery in National Exchange Violations of Rule 10b-5, 54 CoRNru. L. REv. 806, 313
(1969) (security fraud indemnity fund proposed).
There is concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts for actions under § 17(a),
but removal of an action from a state to a federal court is currently unavailable for actions
1970]
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stay may be granted pending the outcome of the action first initiated.78
Arguably, punitive damages, at least against publicly held cor-
porations, are undesirable "because the heavy burden would ultimately
fall on all the stockholders, including mere innocent pawns."'79 Of
course, this argument is inapplicable to the closely held corporation
typically involved in an implied private anti-fraud action; 80 the stock-
holders certainly have control over the corporate agents or concerned
brokers. Despite occasional injury to some innocent stockholders, it
may be more beneficial to allow punitive damages in an effort to deter
securities frauds. 81
A plaintiff's remedies in private actions under section 17(a) and
rule 1Ob-5 are potent, but there are areas where additional punitive
and deterrent devices are needed.82 Under proper procedures, punitive
brought under the 1933 Act. A recent ALI proposal would allow such removal. ALI STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 77-78, 183 (1969).
Lack of congressional intent also causes problems in this area of implied remedies.
See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State Law, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 1249 (1960):
Those who worked on the act most likely gave no thought to the problem of
finding a single forum for a private action .... because there is no reason to
believe that they "intended" any actions under section 14 in the ordinary sense.
Id. at 1275 (emphasis in the original).
78 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967).
79 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
80 See Comment, supra note 50, at 406.
81 [T]here may be good reason to use whatever devices are available to deter
owners and managing officers from tolerating misconduct by employees. If
exemplary damages will encourage employers to exercise closer control over
their servants, there is sufficient ground for awarding them.
Note, supra note 13, at 526; see C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES
§ 80, at 283-84 (1935); PROssER § 2, at 12.
82 Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court may accept jurisdiction
over a case involving both federal and state claims if both claims arose from the same
set of operative facts, even though the federal claim is later dismissed. See UMW v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-28 (1966). See also Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,
81 HARV. L. REv. 657, 668-69 (1968). Thus plaintiff in a securities fraud case may assert
a state common law claim in fraud as well as a federal claim under the Securities Act
of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in federal district court. Jung v. K. & D.
Mining Co., 260 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1958). But see Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S.
252, 257-60 (1964) (federal preemption may preclude state claim). Plaintiff, therefore,
might recover punitive damages on a state common law fraud count in a lOb-5 private
action. Gann v. BernzOmatic Corp., 262 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Note, supra
note 60, at 168 n.20. See generally Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.WV. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdic-
tion and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 475 (1967); Note, The Evolution
and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLuM. L. REV.
1018 (1962); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1040 (1966).
The ALI has proposed enacting the doctrine into federal statutory law (ALI, supra
note 77, at ix, 210-12), and Professor Loss would have the courts use their discretion in
assuming pendent jurisdiction over a count allowing punitive damages if a dichotomy
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damages awarded after an aggravated tort would serve a necessary func-
tion as an extraordinary remedy.
8 3
Richard H. Gilden
were to arise between § 17(a) and rule lOb-5 with respect to this type of remedy. 6
Loss 3783.
83 "If exemplary damages are ever permissible under either act, presumably the
criteria for their award are substantially the same as at common law." 6 Loss 3782 (emphasis
in the original). Proof of a specific intent to deceive is not necessary to show a violation
of § 17(a) or rule 10b-5. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1291 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1970); see Note, Scienter in Private Dam-
age Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Gao. L.J. 1108, 1109 (1969). However, a court should de-
mand proof of such an intent before it awards punitive damages. This ensures that such an
award is granted only in cases of clearly abusive conduct. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum
Co., 302 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Colo. 1969); see Note, supra, at 1115. Federal courts should
apply federal common law criteria for punitive damages rather than the multitude of
tests that exist in the various states. 82 HIv. L. REv. 951, 956 (1969). Contra, Note,
Securities Regulation-Indemnification Agreement Between Underwriter and Issuer Held
Unenforceable as Against Public Policy and Award of Punitive Damages Allowed, 44
N.Y.U.L. R'v. 226, 234 (1969). Four states deny punitive damages altogether. PROSSER
§ 2, at 9 n.60. For a compilation of state damages standards, see Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74, 86 n.1l (3d Cir. 1965). The need for uniformity of treatment arises from the federal
nature of the remedy and the nature of the securities laws. See generally J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.. 180 (1963).
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